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Abstract
UEFA European Championship 1996 qualification is known to violate strategy-
proofness. It has been proved recently that a team could be better off by exerting a
lower effort: it might be optimal to concede some goals in order to achieve a better
position among runners-up, and hence avoid a hazardous play-off. We show that it
is not only an irrelevant scenario with a marginal probability since France had an
incentive to kick two own goals on its last match against Israel.
JEL classification number: C44, D71, L83
AMS classification number: 91B14
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1 Introduction
Suppose you are Zine´dine Zidane,1 a player of the French national association football
team. You are playing against Israel in Group 1 of the 1996 UEFA European Championship
qualification tournament, and your teammate Lizarazu has scored a goal recently, in the
* e-mail: laszlo.csato@uni-corvinus.hu
1 Zine´dine Yazid Zidane is a French retired attacking midfielder and the current manager of Real
Madrid. He was named the best European footballer of the past 50 years in the UEFA Golden Jubilee
Poll in 2004 and is regarded as one of the greatest players of all time.
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89th minute of the match. What should you do? It will be revealed that the optimal
course of action is to kick two goals – in your own net!
According to our knowledge, there were two football matches where a team deliberately
kicked an own goal because of some strange incentives. Perhaps the most famous example
is Barbados vs Grenada (1994 Caribbean Cup qualification), played on January 27, 1994
(Kendall and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.9.4). In the qualifiers, each match must have a
winner to be decided in a sudden-death 30 minutes extra time with a golden goal counting
as two. Barbados needed to win by two goals to progress, otherwise Grenada would
advance. Barbados had a 2-1 lead in the 87th minute, when the players realized that by
scoring an own goal, they would have much more time remaining to win by two goals.
After choosing this radical strategy, they succeeded in preserving the 2-2 result. Finally,
Barbados have managed to score a goal in extra time and qualified. FIFA did not penalize
the Barbados Federation since they behaved according to the prevailing rules. Nevertheless,
this controversial rule was never used again.
The second case was Thailand vs Indonesia in the 1998 Tiger Cup on 31 August 1998
(Kendall and Lenten, 2017, Section 3.9.2). Both teams were already qualified for the
semi-finals such that the group-winner would face hosting Vietnam, while the runner-up
would play against Singapore, perceived to be the easier opponent, and would avoid moving
the team’s training base. The score was 2-2 after 90 minutes implying Indonesia would be
the group-winner. However, in extra time an Indonesian defender deliberately scored an
own goal despite the Thai’s attempts to stop him doing so. FIFA fined both teams 40, 000
for ’violating the spirit of the game’, furthermore, the Indonesian defender was banned
from domestic football for one year and international football for life.
On the other hand, it has been shown recently that tournaments with subsequent
group stages, where matches played in the preliminary round between players who qualify
to the next round are carried over, suffer from such perverse incentives, and there existed
at least two matches where a team had an incentive to win by few goals difference, possibly
by throwing own goals (Csato´, 2017c). However, we do not know about the use of this
format in soccer.
Besides a careful analysis of historical events, we think it is also important to consider
possible scandals since rules may have a low probability to go awry, but the potential costs
can be enormous. Dagaev and Sonin (2013), Dagaev and Sonin (2017), Csato´ (2017a)
and Csato´ (2018) have shown such hypothetical examples. Csato´ (2017b) proved by a
theoretical model that 1996 UEFA European Championship qualification was incentive
incompatible, in other words, a team might be strictly better off by playing a draw (or
even losing) instead of winning. In the following, we will describe just such a situation
at the first time, which occurred in the match France vs Israel, played on 15 November
1995. Since the manipulation by France might have hurt a third team, it would be a more
serious case than Barbados vs Grenada.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the qualification rules
and outlines their theoretical model. The particular situation is detailed in Section 3, and
we conclude in Section 4.
2 Theoretical background
1996 UEFA European Championship qualification divided 47 teams into seven groups of six
and one group of five teams. All teams played a home-and-away round-robin tournament in
their groups. The group winners along with the six best runners-up qualified automatically,
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while the two worst runners-up were involved in a play-off.
This was the first time when the qualification for the European Football Championship
awarded three points (instead of two) for a win. Tie-breaking rules in the groups were as
follows:
1. greater number of points obtained in all group matches (three points for a win,
one for a draw and no points for a defeat);
2. greater number of points obtained in the matches played between the teams
concerned;
3. superior goal difference in the matches played between the teams concerned;
4. greater number of goals scored away from home in the matches played between
the teams concerned.
Further tie-breaking rules in the groups are not relevant for us.
The runners-up were placed in a separate table to rank them such that only matches
played against the first, third and fourth teams of the groups were regarded. Tie-breaking
rules among the second-placed teams were as follows:
1. greater number of points obtained in the group matches considered;
2. superior goal difference in the group matches considered;
3. greater number of goals scored in the group matches considered.
Further tie-breaking rules are not relevant for us.
The difference of ranking in the groups and ranking among second-placed teams (from
different groups) is responsible for the incentive incompatibility of the qualification. In
the latter case, the matches played against the fifth, and – in some groups – against the
sixth teams are discarded, therefore a runner-up can influence its performance measures
among second-placed teams by changing the fourth and fifth teams in its group. Due to
the monotonicity of group ranking, a team cannot achieve a better position in its group
by kicking an own goal but it may gain some goals or even points in the comparison of
runners-up, provided that it remains the second. Hence, it may qualify automatically for
the final tournament as one of the six best second-placed teams, instead of playing a risky
play-off match.
This argument can be applied in the theoretical analysis of a similar group-based
qualification system 𝒬 where participating teams are divided into 𝑘 groups such that the
number of teams is 𝑛𝑖 in group 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑘. Furthermore, under a given set of match
results R, the top 𝑎𝑖 ≥ 0 teams in group 𝑖 directly qualify, while the next 𝑏𝑖 ≥ 0 teams –
whose set is denoted by 𝐵𝑖(R) – are compared in a so-called extra group. The remaining
𝑛𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖 ≥ 0 teams are eliminated.
Let 𝐵(R) = ∑︀𝑘𝑖=1𝐵𝑖(R) be the set of teams of the extra group. In the extra group,
only the group matches against the top 𝑐𝑖 teams are considered, where 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖 ≤ 𝑐𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑖.
Suppose that direct qualification is preferred to advancing to play-offs, which is better
than being eliminated. These three sets of teams are denoted by 𝑇1(R), 𝑇2(R), and 𝑇3(R),
respectively.
Let 𝒬 be a group-based qualification system with the set of match results R and 𝑥 be
a team. The set of match results R′x is said to be disadvantageous for team 𝑥, if R and R′x
are identical except for some opponents of team 𝑥 have scored more goals against it in R′x.
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Definition 1. Manipulation: Team 𝑥 can manipulate the group-based qualification system
𝒬 under the set of match results R if there exists a set of match results R′x, which is
disadvantageous for team 𝑥 such that one of the following holds: (1) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑇3(R) but
𝑥 ∈ 𝑇1(R′x) ∪ 𝑇2(R′x); or (2) 𝑥 ∈ 𝑇2(R) but 𝑥 ∈ 𝑇1(R′x).
In other words, team 𝑥 is strictly better off after its manipulation despite the set of
match results is disadvantageous for it.
This setting may allow for incentive incompatibility.
Proposition 1. Let 𝒬 be a group-based qualification system. There exists a set of match
results R and a team 𝑥 ∈ 𝐵(R) that can manipulate the qualification under R if:
∙ the number of groups is at least 𝑘 ≥ 2;
∙ there is a difference in the allocation of teams in the extra group, that is, at least
two of the sets 𝐵(R) ∩ 𝑇1(R), 𝐵(R) ∩ 𝑇2(R), and 𝐵(R) ∩ 𝑇3(R) are non-empty;
∙ there are more teams than 𝑛𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 ≥ 1 behind team 𝑥 in its group 𝑖.
Proof. It is covered by the model described in Csato´ (2017b), specifically, see Csato´ (2017b,
Theorem 1). The proof is based on the idea presented above, that is, a team can improve its
position in the extra group – by influencing its set of matches taken in the extra group into
account – through conceding some goals, which is impossible if all matches against teams
behind team 𝑥 are discarded or counted in the extra group. It makes the last condition
of Proposition 1 necessary. The second requirement guarantees that achieving a better
position among the teams of the extra group is effective with respect to qualification.
Further discussion of Proposition 1 and conditions providing strategy-proofness can be
found in Csato´ (2017b).
3 The potential scandal
1996 UEFA European Championship qualification is covered by the model presented in
Section 2. The top team directly qualified to the tournament (𝑎𝑖 = 1), while the next
team were placed into an extra group for each group 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . . , 8 (𝑏𝑖 = 1). The top six
runners-up also qualified, however, the two worst were involved in a play-off. Consequently,
|𝐵(R) ∩ 𝑇1(R)| = 6 and |𝐵(R) ∩ 𝑇2(R)| = 2. Finally, 𝑐𝑖 = 4 and 𝑛𝑖 = 6 with the
exception of 𝑛3 = 5, so there are two teams more than 𝑛𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 behind any second-placed
team (the third and the fourth) in its group 𝑖. Hence the conditions of Proposition 1 are
satisfied, implying the incentive incompatibility of the qualification: there exists a set of
match results under which an arbitrary runner-up can manipulate it.
Now we will show that the qualification tournament was very close to such a situation.
Table 1 shows the standing of Group 1 before the last match of France against Israel,
played on 15 November 1995 at 20:45 according to Central European Time in Caen, France.
The other two matches of Group 1 in the last matchday were started at 16:00 and 17:30
on the same day, so Table 1 can be assumed as common knowledge at the beginning of
this particular match. France led by a score of 2-0 at the 89th minute. What were the
options of the team?
France is guaranteed to be the second (it would have at least 17 and at most 20 points),
so players should aim to achieve a better position among the runners-up, where matches
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Table 1: 1996 UEFA European Championship qualification – Group 1: Final standing
before the last match France against Israel
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Romania 6 3 1 18 9 9 21
2 France 4 5 0 20 2 18 17
3 Slovakia 4 2 4 14 18 -4 14
4 Poland 3 4 3 14 12 2 13
5 Israel 3 3 3 13 11 2 12
6 Azerbaijan 0 1 9 2 29 -27 1
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. Romania, Slovakia, Poland and Azerbaijan have played 10, France and Israel
9 matches.
Table 2: 1996 UEFA European Championship qualification – Group 1: Match results
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Romania — 1-3 3-2 2-1 2-1 3-0
2 France 0-0 — 4-0 1-1 ? 10-0
3 Slovakia 0-2 0-0 — 4-1 1-0 4-1
4 Poland 0-0 0-0 5-0 — 4-3 1-0
5 Israel 1-1 0-0 2-2 2-1 — 2-0
6 Azerbaijan 1-4 0-2 0-1 0-0 0-2 —
Position is given without the match France against Israel
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
played against the fifth (Poland or Israel) and the sixth (Azerbaijan) teams are discarded.
If France defeats Israel, the latter would get the fifth place in Group 1, therefore France has
10 points, 8 goals for and 2 goals against (a goal difference of +6) among the second-placed
teams, according to Table 2.
However, if France concedes two goals, Israel would be the fourth due to its 13 points
and better head-to-head result against Poland (see Table 2): they have 3 points and a goal
difference of zero against each other, but Israel scored 3 goals away, while Poland scored
only 1 goal away. Consequently, France would have 10 points, 9 goals for and 3 goals
against (a goal difference of +6) among the second-placed teams. Since the two worst
runners-up are involved in a play-off for qualification, but the first six directly qualify, it is
strictly better to have the same number of points and the same goal difference with more
goals scored in the ranking of second-placed teams. Zidane should have kicked two own
goals, or have agreed with his teammates to make some mistakes in defence as a draw of
2-2 is also preferred by Israel.
Our analysis is based only on information available at the time of the match France
against Israel, so all coaches and players could have recognized the strange situation.
However, probably the current paper gives the first description of this observation.
4 Conclusions
The actual result of the match France vs Israel remained 2-0. Perhaps the players were
honest, despite the risk involved in not conceding two goals. Maybe they were well-
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informed: the difference between the two scenarios was marginal and could not influence
whether France was among the top six runners-up qualifying automatically, although some
matches were played later.
Nevertheless, it makes no sense to deny that the shadow of a major outrage floated
above 1996 UEFA European Championship qualification, identified to be the first incentive
incompatible qualifying for UEFA European Championships (Csato´, 2017b). We hope the
presented example is a clear warning for football governing bodies to organize strategy-
proof qualifications in the future. They can follow the mechanism suggested by Csato´
(2017b) to guarantee this crucial property.
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